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TOURO LAWREVIEW
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Haishun"'
(decided April 21, 1997)
Defendant, William J. Haishun, was convicted of driving while
intoxicated.135 He appealed to the Appellate Division, Second
Department, claiming that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
Federal'36 and New York State'3 7 Constitutions require vacatur of
his sentence.'38 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
affirmed the decision of the Orange County Court, holding that
the mandatory license suspension followed by a court sentence for
the same underlying act does not violate the protections against
Double Jeopardy. 
139
134 238 A.D.2d 521, 656 N.Y.S.2d 660 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 90
N.Y.2d 940, 687 N.E.2d 655, 664 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1997).
135 Id. at 521, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661. Defendant was charged with two counts
of driving while intoxicated and he pleaded guilty to one count. Id.
136 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]o person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life and limb . . . ." Id.
137 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "[N]o
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense . .. .
Id.
138 Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 521, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
139 Id. (citing People v. Roach, 226 A.D.2d 55, 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609
(4th Dep't 1996) (holding that the suspension of the defendant's driver's
license pending prosecution for the offense of driving while intoxicated did not
constitute multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause); In
re Smith v. County Ct. of Essex County, 224 A.D.2d 89, 92, 649 N.Y.S.2d
507, 509 (3d Dep't 1996) (holding that a criminal prosecution following a
suspension of a driver's license for the same underlying conduct did not violate
defendant's rights against double jeopardy)).
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On November 3, 1995, defendant was arrested for driving while
intoxicated in violation of sections 1192(2)40 and 1192(3)"'t of the
New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law [hereinafter "VTL"]."4
Thereafter, in accordance with the provisions of VTL §
1193(2)(e)(7),' 4 ' defendant's driver's license was suspended."
Subsequently, defendant was sentenced by the court after he
entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving while
intoxicated. 45 Defendant appealed, arguing that the mandatory
suspension of his driver's license, followed by the sentencing of
the court, subjected him to successive punishments for the same
act, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal
and New York State Constitutions.14 6  In addition, defendant
140 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1192 (2) (McKinney 1996). Section 1192(2)
provides:
Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a
motor vehicle while such person has .10 of one per centum
or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown
by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or
saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven
hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
141 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(3) provides: "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a
motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.142 Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 521, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
143 N.Y. VBH. & TRAF. LAw § 1193(2)(e)(7) (McKinney 1996). This
section provides for the immediate suspension of one's driver's license pending
the prosecution on the charge of driving while intoxicated and states:
A court shall suspend a driver's license, pending prosecution,
of any person charged with a violation of subdivision two or
three of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article
who, at the time of arrest, is alleged to have had .10 of one
percent or more by weight of alcohol in such driver's blood
as shown by chemical analysis of blood, breath, urine or
saliva, made pursuant to subdivision two or three of section
eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
144 Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 521, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
145 Id.
146 Id. (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)
(recognizing that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy protects
1998
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contended that § 1193 (2)(e)(7) of the VTL violated the Due
Process Clauses of the Federal 1
47 and New York State 4 1
Constitutions. 4
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that "[u]nder
certain circumstances, the imposition of civil sanctions can
constitute punishment for underlying criminal conduct, thereby
triggering the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.""15'
However, a criminal statute and a civil forfeiture statute may be
successively enforced without triggering a double jeopardy
violation."5 In order to determine whether the prosecution of the
"against multiple punishment for the same offense"); In re Smith v. County
Ct. of Essex County, 224 A.D.2d 89, 90, 649 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (3d Dep't
1996) (holding that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution protects
individuals from "multiple punishment for the same offense.").
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.. .. " Id.
148 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." Id.
149Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
"' Id. (quoting People v. Roach, 226 A.D.2d 55, 58, 649 N.Y.S.2d 607,
609 (4th Dep't 1996)).
'' Id. (citing In re v. County Ct. of Essex County, 224 A.D.2d 89, 90, 649
N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (3d Dep't 1996)) (citations omitted). In Smith, petitioner's
driver's license was administratively suspended following his arrest for driving
while intoxicated. Id. at 89-90, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08. Thereafter, he was
indicted and arraigned on an indictment for the charges of operating a vehicle
with an excessive blood alcohol level and driving while intoxicated. Id. at 90,
649 N.Y.S.2d at 508. After petitioner's motion to dismiss the indictment was
denied, he brought an Article 78 proceeding to prohibit the court from
continuing with his pending trial on the grounds that his Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy rights were violated. Id. In holding that the suspension of a
driver's license followed by a trial for the underlying offense did not violate
double jeopardy, the court reasoned that "constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy and double punishment do not prevent the enactment of both
civil and criminal sanctions for the same conduct" Id. (citations omitted). See
also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). In Helvering, the United
States Supreme Court determined that a monetary penalty imposed upon a
defendant for income tax evasion was remedial in nature and therefore
constituted a civil sanction. Id. at 401. The Court stated that "Congress may
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or
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driving while intoxicated offense together with the suspension of
defendant's driver's license violated double jeopardy, the court
applied the two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Ursery.
5 2
In Ursery, the Supreme Court held that civil forfeitures did not
constitute additional punishment for the purpose of invoking the
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions. 53  In Ursery, the United States government
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings-" against Ursery's property,
contending that it was utilized for the purpose of conducting
illegal drug transactions.'55 Subsequently, Ursery was indicted
and convicted for the crime of manufacturing marijuana. 56 In
omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or
attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense." Id. at
399. Accordingly, the Court held that enforcement of a remedial civil statute
does not invoke double jeopardy protection. Id. at 404.
'Id. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
'5 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the appellate court which held that the forfeiture of a
defendant's property and the punishment for the underlying criminal violated
the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. Id. at
2138.
154 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. 1997). This section provides in pertinent
part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United
States and no property right shall exist in them: All real
property, including any right, title, and interest.., in the
whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than
one year's imprisonment.
Id.
'55 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138-39. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and consolidated Ursery with a similar case wherein a civil forfeiture
proceeding was instituted against the defendants who were later convicted of
money-laundering and drug conspiracy. Id. at 2138.
156 Id. at 2139. Defendant was indicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1)
(1984). This section provides in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by this
subehapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
1998
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determining that the civil forfeiture did not constitute multiple
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, the Ursery Court set
forth a two-prong test, 15 7 which includes two basic questions.
First, whether the legislature intended to categorize the procedure
at issue as a criminal proceeding or as a civil proceeding. 58
Second, whether the civil proceeding is so punitive that it could
not possibly be viewed as civil. 159 Regarding the first prong, the
Ursery Court examined Congress' intent to determine that
forfeiture proceedings are civil proceedings."' With regard to
the second prong, although the Ursery Court noted that the civil
forfeiture statute encompasses a deterrent element therein, the
court nonetheless held that this element was not so punitive so as
to render the civil forfeiture into a criminal statute to which
double jeopardy applies.16"'
This test was followed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Cordero v. Lalor.'62 The Cordero court was faced with the
question of whether disciplinary sanctions imposed on an inmate
at a prison, followed by criminal prosecution, invoked double
intentionally. . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Id.
' Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984)). In 89 Firearms, defendant was indicted and
acquitted on criminal charges of dealing firearms without a license. Id. at 355.
At trial, defendant asserted the defense of entrapment and was acquitted of the
charges. Id. at 356. Thereafter, the Government instituted an action for the
forfeiture of the firearms. Id. Defendant contended that the forfeiture
proceeding constituted multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 362. The Supreme Court held that the
forfeiture proceeding brought against the defendant was a civil remedial
sanction, rather that criminal punishment and therefore, not barred by double
jeopardy. Id. at 366. The Court reasoned that Congress intended forfeiture as
a civil remedial sanction with its goal aimed at keeping dangerous weapons
away from unlicensed dealers. Id. at 364. Moreover, the civil forfeiture is a
separate sanction and not an additional penalty for the criminal act. Id. at 366.
158 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
159 Id.
160 id.
161 Id. at 2149.
162 89 N.Y.2d 521, 678 N.E.2d 482, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1997).
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jeopardy protection. '6 Applying the Ursery test, the court found
that prison disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and serve
the institutional interests of maintaining prison discipline and
safety. 164 Therefore, the court concluded that "the disciplinary
sanctions imposed upon appellants did not constitute criminal
punishment triggering double jeopardy protection.'6,
Similarly in Roach, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
held that the immediate suspension of defendant's driver's license
did not bar subsequent prosecution for the crime of driving while
intoxicated. 66 Applying the first prong of the Ursery test, the
court found that "the statute is intended to be a civil sanction for
the failure to pass a chemical sobriety test and is not a criminal
penalty for the underlying offense of driving while
intoxicated." 167 In analyzing the second prong of the Ursery test,
the court found that the suspension of a driver's license "may be
legitimately viewed as a sanction that is primarily civil in nature"
which serves the remedial purpose of "protecting the public from
potentially drunk drivers."1' Accordingly, the court concluded
that defendant's protection against double jeopardy was not
violated by the prompt suspension of his driver's license. 69
In Haishun, after applying the Ursery test, the court concluded
that driver's license suspension under the provisions of VTL
163 Id. at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 483-84, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
164 Id. at 532, 678 N.E.2d at 488, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
16 Id. at 532-33, 678 N.E.2d at 488-89, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
"6 People v. Roach, 226 A.D.2d 55, 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (4th Dep't
1996). In Roach, defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated. Id at
57, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 608. Several days later, a hearing was held at which time
defendant's driver's license was suspended. Id. Thereafter, a trial was held
and defendant was convicted and sentenced for driving while intoxicated. Id.
Defendant sought to dismiss the criminal prosecution on the grounds that it
was barred by double jeopardy. Id.
167 Id. at 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 609. The Roach court noted that the
placement of the prompt suspension law in the "License Sanctions" section of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law rather than in the "Criminal Penalties" section
was additional proof of the Legislature's intent to regard the law as a civil
sanction. Id.
163 Id. at 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
169 Id. at 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
1998 917
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§ 1193(2)(e)(7) was intended by the Legislature "to be a civil
sanction for the failure to pass a chemical sobriety test and is a
criminal penalty for the underlying offense of driving while
intoxicated.' 70  Relying on well settled principles, the court
construed the suspension of a driver's license as a sanction that is
civil in nature.17 ' The prompt suspension law serves a remedial
public purpose with its primary aim to protect "the public from
potentially dangerous drunk drivers." 172 Accordingly, the civil
statute authorizing the suspension of a driver's license does not
cause a subsequent criminal procedure to violate double jeopardy
because the two statutes can co-exist.
7 1
The suspension of a driver's license cannot be a successive
punishment because the deprivation of a driver's license cannot
be quantified so as to constitute a disproportionate sanction
170 People v. Haishun, 238 A.D.2d 521, 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (2d
Dep't 1997) (quoting Roach, 226 A.D.2d at 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 609).
17' Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661 (citations omitted).
See People v. Ferraiolo, 223 A.D.2d 556, 557, 636 N.Y.S.2d 378, 378 (2d
Dep't 1996). See also Barnes v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74, 78, 261 N.E.2d 617,
620, 313 N.Y.S.2d 690, 694 (1970) (finding that the suspension of a driver's
license is civil in nature with its primary goal to protect the public from
dangerous drivers); People v. Gerstner, 168 Misc. 2d 495, 499, 638 N.Y.S.2d
559, 562 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1996) (concluding that "although a license
suspension pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §1193(2)(e)(7) may have a
deterrent effect, its primary aim and objective is the promotion of highway
safety.").
172 Roach, 226 A.D.2d at 59, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 610. See also Governor's
Mem. 1994 N.Y. LAWS 2972 which provides in pertinent part:
Prompt suspension not only serves a general deterrent by
mandating swift and certain penalties, but also keeps the
potentially dangerous driver off the road during adjudication
of the criminal charge .... Drunk, drugged and otherwise
unsafe drivers continue to plague our streets and endanger
our welfare. The persistence of these threats makes clear
that additional steps must be taken to rid our roads of these
dangers.
Id.
" Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661. See Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); Barnes v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74, 78, 261
N.E.2d 617, 619, 313 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693 (1970).
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relative to the harm prevented. 7 4 Accordingly, applying the two-
prong test, the Haishun court found that suspension of the
defendant's driver's license followed by sentencing of the court
for driving while intoxicated is not the multiple punishments
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and
State Constitutions. 75
With reference to defendant's second contention, the Haishun
court invoked the principles set forth in Pringle v. Wolfe7 6 to
determine whether the prompt suspension law '" violated the Due
Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. 7 1 In
Pringle, the New York Court of Appeals determined that the
statute does not violate due process because it provides that a
hearing be held before the suspension of a driver's license.'79
Moreover, at the hearing, the driver is entitled to present
evidence to challenge the findings of the court.'0 This right to a
hearing affords the driver the due process protection guaranteed
under the Federal and State Constitutions.' Hence, the Haishrn
court determined that the administrative suspension of defendant's
license did not involve a constitutional violation of due process."
'" United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2145 (1996).
175 Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
176 88 N.Y.2d 426, 668 N.E.2d 1376, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82, cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 513 (1996). In Pringle, plaintiff was charged with driving while
intoxicated. Id. at 430, 668 N.E.2d at 1378, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85. Before his
arraignment, plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment to declare
the prompt suspension law unconstitutional. Id. at 430, 668 N.E.2d at 1379-
80, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
"n Id. at 429, 668 N.E.2d at 1378, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 84. N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1193 (2)(e)(7) is commonly referred to as the "prompt
suspension law." Id.
78 Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
179 Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 432, 668 N.E.2d at 1379, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
1 Id. at 432, 668 N.E.2d at 1380, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 86. See N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b) which provides in pertinent part: "At the time
of such license suspension the holder shall be entitled to an opportunity to
make a statement regarding these two issues and to present evidence tending to
rebut the court's findings." Id.
181 Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 434, 668 N.E.2d at 1381, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
182 Haishun, 238 A.D.2d at 522, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
1998 919
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In conclusion, New York State courts have adhered to a two-
prong test set forth by the federal courts when assessing whether
an administrative suspension of a driver's license followed by a
prosecution for an underlying crime of driving while intoxicated
violates double jeopardy.1 8 3  New York State cases are replete
with citations to federal cases which have held that a driver's
license suspension followed by prosecution for the underlying
crime is not violative of double jeopardy. 1" Hence, the state
position is analogous to the federal position and the prompt




(decided February 3, 1997)
Defendant appeals his conviction of the charge of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree, claiming a violation
of his constitutional rights"8 6 and statutory protections against
double jeopardy."8 7 "The defendant had moved to dismiss the
183 id.
184 id.
134 653 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1997). In his first trial, defendant, Kellon
Quamina, was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in
the second degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree. Id. at 613. He was acquitted of the charges in the second
degree, but the jury could not reach a verdict for the charges in the third
degree. Id. A new trial was ordered as to theses charges. Id. Defendant was
convicted at the subsequent trial and appealed. Id.
186 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." Id. Similarly, N.Y. CONST. Article I § 6 states: "No person
shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id.
187 Id. See also N.Y. CriM. PROC. § 40.20. (McKinney 1989). Section
40.20 provides the following:
(1) A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same
offense (2) A person may not be separately prosecuted for
two offenses based upon the same act or criminal based on
the same transaction unless: (a) The offenses as defined have
substantially different elements and the acts establishing one
920 [Vol 14
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